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Abstract 
 In the late 2000s, the world grain markets experienced severe turbulence with 
rapid crop price rises caused by bad crops, oil price hikes, export restrictions, and the 
emergence of biofuels as well as financial speculation. We review the impacts of the first four 
real-side factors using a world trade computable general equilibrium model. Our simulation 
results show that oil and biofuels-related shocks were the major factors among these four in 
crop price hikes but that these real-side factors in total can explain only about 10% of the 
actual crop price rises. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1  Causes and Consequences of the Commodity Boom 
 The world crop markets experienced significant turbulence before and after the 
financial crisis that occurred in 2008. Rice, wheat, and maize prices had quadrupled, tripled, 
and doubled, respectively before the bubble burst (Figure 1). After the financial crisis, 
however, their prices reverted to the levels observed in 2005, except for rice, whose price 
hike was only halved. The price hikes can be attributed to several factors: bad crops, 
cost-push by the oil price hike, demand increase for biofuels production, restrictions on crop 
exports, and speculation. 
 Bad crops hit several major wheat producers. Australia, which covers 16% of world 
wheat exports in 2004, had a streak of bad harvests losing 44% and 36% of its wheat output 
in 2006 and 2007, respectively, compared with that in 2004. Ukraine, the ninth largest 
exporter with a 2% share of the world’s wheat exports, also had a very poor crop season in 
2007. 
 In the mid-2000s, oil prices had steadily risen and tripled to push up prices of 
various goods due to production costs. This led major crop-producing countries to explore 
biofuels as substitutes for conventional fossil fuels. The world’s biofuels production 
increased very rapidly in this period. The EU (producing biodiesel from oilseeds), the US and 
Brazil (producing bioethanol from maize and sugarcane), and others produced 46.5 million 
liters of crude oil equivalent biofuels in 2007. This is, however, negligibly small compared 
with the total crude oil supply. This commitment to biofuels caused more severe competition 
for food crops between food consumption and energy uses. 
 In reaction to the crop price hikes, some countries restricted their crop exports to 
secure their domestic supply (Table 1), triggering crop prices spikes (Figure 1). The 
countries that resorted to these export restrictions supply about 43% of rice and 19% of 
wheat in their international markets. As rice has a very thin international market, its 
market price was much more volatile than that of other crops. 
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1.2  Literature Review 
 The market turbulence was indeed dramatic. Many studies have tried to uncover 
the factors behind the 2008 food crisis. Debate is still keen. Heady and Fan (2008) as well as 
Timmer (2008) attribute the causes to various factors that are commonly recognized, such as 
increasing food demand in China and India, speculation, export restrictions, short-run or 
long-run productivity, depreciation of the US dollar, oil prices, biofuels, and the decline of 
stocks. Wright (2011) rejects all but the combination of the last two by emphasizing the role 
of stock demand, which arises only in low price periods.1 
 Yang et al. (2008) investigate the impact of the petroleum price hike and an 
increase of biofuels production using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, based 
on the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database version 6 (Table 2).2 Mitchell (2008) 
examines its impacts on the production cost of wheat and maize production in the US and 
their domestic transportation costs. Charlesbois (2008) estimates the influence of export 
restrictions on crops using a multi-country dynamic partial equilibrium model. Rosegrant 
(2008) measures the impacts of biofuels production on these crops using a partial 
equilibrium model by assuming different biofuel production growth rates. Yang et al. (2008) 
also quantify its impact on prices of wheat and maize and find similar results to those by 
Rosegrant (2008). These studies consistently show real-side factors have only limited 
explanatory power for the crop price hikes. Du et al. (2011) examine the financial aspect of 
the crop market with the futures markets data and find that volatility spillovers among 
                                                     
1 Wright (2011) considers two types of demand: demand for consumption and for stocks. Following the 
"buy low, sell high" rule, the stock demand arises only when the price and the stock level are low. Only 
consumption demand, which is supposed to be less price elastic than the stock demand, remains when 
the price is high. 
2 See Hertel (1997) for the GTAP database and its standard CGE model and Burniaux and Truong 
(2002) for the GTAP-E model. 
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 11-16
  Page 4 
crude oil, maize, and wheat prices significant in the boom period. This is similar to the 
finding by Roache (2010), inferring that the oil-crop linkage has become important through 
the recent emergence of biofuels. Cooke and Robles (2009) also attribute the price rise to 
speculator factors by their time series analysis. 
 The earlier studies on those real-side factors, however, do not consider the crop 
failure of wheat in Australia and/or Ukraine in the latter half of the 2000s. The rice sector 
has not been analyzed in the context of the recent food crisis or petroleum price hikes. 
Rosegrant’s (2008) analysis of the biofuels’ impact does not reach 2008, when the grain 
prices rose most severely. The partial equilibrium models used by Rosegrant (2008) and 
Charlesbois (2008) do not describe any linkages among crop and food markets through 
intermediate input demand and their substitution in consumption. Biofuels are also used as 
a substitute for fossil fuels to ease the oil price rise while causing food shortages through 
competition in the food markets. Although Yang et al. (2008) model the competition among 
crops and biofuels for farm-land assuming its flexible reallocation among crops, the 
farm-land switching was not conspicuous in recent years (Figure 2). 
 We need further and more detailed examinations of the impacts of the crop market 
turbulence with a comprehensive framework of the world trade CGE model that enables us 
to capture the interaction among markets by alternatively assuming such factors and 
situations that the earlier studies do not consider. We simulate various real-side shocks 
observed in the latter half of the 2000s to investigate what factors caused the crop price 
hikes and to what extent these real-side factors can explain the hikes. Using a static CGE 
model with inter-sectoral immobility of farm-land, we focus on short-run phenomena 
marked especially during the recent food crisis period. 
 This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains our CGE model and simulation 
scenarios for our decomposition analysis of the price hike factors. Section 3 shows our 
simulation results, followed by the concluding Section 4. 
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2.  Model and Simulation Scenarios 
2.1  Model Structure 
 A single-country CGE model used in Devarajan et al. (1990) is extended to a 
multi-country model for this study, à la Hosoe et al. (2010, Ch. 10). We use the GTAP 
database version 7.1, whose reference year is 2004. Regions are aggregated so that we can 
focus on major producers of grains and biofuels (Table 3). To describe biofuels in our model, 
we newly distinguish three sectors important for biofuels (maize, bioethanol, and biodiesel) 
other than the original 11 sectors in the GTAP dataset by using a technique similar to the 
one that Taheripour et al. (2008) use.3 
 Each sector has a perfectly competitive profit maximizing firm with Leontief 
production function for gross output (Figure 3).4 While labor is mobile among sectors, 
capital stocks, farmland, and natural resources are assumed to be immobile among sectors. 
The value-added composite made of these primary factors is combined with intermediate 
inputs and an energy composite to produce gross output, which is allocated between 
domestic good supply and composite exports by a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) 
function. The composite exports are further decomposed into outbound shipping to 
individual regions with a CET technology. Similarly, the domestic goods and composite 
imports made of inbound shipping from various regions are combined into composite goods 
with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function following Armington (1969). The 
composite imports are generated with imports shipped from various regions. The elasticities 
of the CES and CET functions of imports and exports are quoted from the GTAP database. 
The energy composite is made of non-liquid energy inputs (coal, gas, and electricity) and a 
liquid energy composite with a Cobb-Douglas technology.5 The liquid energy composite is 
                                                     
3 Details are described in Appendix I. 
4 The model equations are described in Appendix II. 
5 As Burniaux and Truong (2002) assume that the elasticity of substitution among energy inputs is 0.5 
or 1.0 in the GTAP-E model, we follow their assumption. 
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also made of liquid energy inputs (oil, bioethanol, and biodiesel) with a CES technology.6  
 A representative household maximizes its utility subject to its budget constraints. 
Consumption is determined by two-stage budgeting (Figure 4). First, the household 
considers a trade-off among various food-related goods. Its food consumption is aggregated 
into a food composite with a CES function, whose elasticity of substitution is assumed to be 
0.1, following Tanaka and Hosoe (2011). At the top stage, the household considers a trade-off 
among the food composite and the other goods. The household determines its energy use in 
the same manner that industries do with a nested CES aggregation. The other domestic 
final demand (government and investment) is kept constant while their expenses are 
supported by lump-sum transfers from the household in the forms of a direct tax and 
savings. 
 
2.2  Simulation Scenarios 
 The four types of shocks are considered individually in Scenarios C, R, P, and B. 
The fifth Scenario A considers all four at once (Table 4). Even if we take account of all these 
four major real-side factors in Scenario A, the estimated price rises of these crops will fall 
short of the actual price rise. This gap could be attributed to non-real-side factors, i.e., 
speculation. To compute the magnitude of the crop price hikes, the nominal international 
prices of crops and crude oil reported in the IMF Primary Commodity Prices are deflated 
with the global inflation data reported in the IMF's World Economic Outlook. The price rise 
                                                     
6 The elasticity of substitution for the liquid energy aggregation function is set to be two, assuming 
these liquid energy inputs are a closer substitute than the liquid and the non-liquid inputs. We 
conducted a sensitivity analysis with respect to the elasticity of substitution for these two energy input 
aggregation functions and found our results to be robust, as summarized in Appendix III. 
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in wheat, rice, and maize are estimated to be 87%, 165%, and 79% during 2004–2008.7 
 In Scenario C (Crop failures), we simulate the bad wheat crops in Australia and 
Ukraine that occurred in 2007 (Table 1).8 These shocks are given to the total factor 
productivity parameter in the gross output production function (Figure 3). Scenario R 
(export Restrictions) captures the impact of the export restrictions on crops. While many 
countries set some type of export restrictions such as bans, quotas, and taxes, we focus on 
the actions by the six major countries with market shares larger than 1% of the world 
exports.9 We assume a 95% cut of exports as an approximation of export bans to avoid 
computational difficulty in our CGE model, where a nested CES structure is used to describe 
the bilateral trade patterns. In Scenario P (Petroleum), an oil price hike of 126% is assumed. 
This price rise is generated by imposition of export taxes on crude oil at the same rate by all 
oil exporters. Scenario B (Biofuels) is designed to evaluate the impact of bioethanol 
production from maize and sugarcane in the US and Brazil, respectively, and that of 
biodiesel production from oilseeds in the EU. We set the bioethanol and biodiesel production 
at the actual level in 2008 leveraged by production subsidies for these two sectors. 
 
                                                     
7 The IMF Primary Commodity Prices reports export prices of the world’s largest exporters as the 
world market prices. That is, the world prices of wheat, rice, and maize are the prices of “U.S. No. 1 
hard red winter, ordinary protein, prompt shipment, FOB $/Mt Gulf of Mexico ports,” “Thai, white 
milled, 5 percent broken, nominal price quotes, FOB Bangkok,” and “U.S. No. 2 yellow, prompt 
shipment, FOB Gulf of Mexico ports.” In our CGE analysis, we follow these definitions and examine 
impacts of various shocks on the export prices of wheat and maize by the US, and that of processed rice 
by Thailand all in terms of the US dollar. 
8 The productivity is measured by the yield per arable land reported in FAOSTAT. 
9 As Ukraine also set export quotas (World Bank (2008)) but actually carried out more exports, 
reported by FAOSTAT, than the quota ceiling, we do not consider its export restriction. 
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3. Simulation Results 
 The crop failure was the largest contributor to the wheat price rise among the four 
factors, while it little affected the other markets (Table 5). Although Ukraine was often 
quoted as one of the major cause of wheat shortage, it did not give any sizable shock to the 
world export supply (Figure 5). It should also be noted that this price rise was brought about 
through the contraction of the wheat exports, not through any sizable loss of production 
(Scenario C). Export restrictions directly cut the wheat exports to raise its price further 
(Scenario R). On the other hand, the US dollar appreciated due to the petroleum price rise; 
this led to a moderate rise of the dollar-denominated wheat price (Scenario P). 
 While no productivity shock occurred in the rice sector, the export restrictions were 
the major cause of its price rise (Table 5). This price rise is particularly sharp, partly 
because the international rice market was far thinner than that for other crops and partly 
because export restrictions covered rice more widely than others. Among several incidences 
of rice export restrictions, those by Vietnam and India were marked (Figure 5). Although we 
assume shocks that are anticipated to cause crop price rises, our simulation result shows a 
fall of the international rice price. Because the petroleum price rise increased the hard 
currency expenses for oil imports by Thailand and caused a depreciation of the Thai baht, 
the rice price fell, as measured by the Thai export price in US dollars,. 
 The maize price was driven mainly by two energy-related factors: the petroleum 
price rise and the emergence of biofuels (Table 5). The former caused a demand for biofuel 
production as a substitute of petroleum. The impact of the latter was far larger. Maize was 
used for the biofuels production in the US and reduced its maize exports to trigger a price 
rise that was twice as large as that caused by the petroleum price rise. 
 In sum, the crop failure caused a price rise only in the wheat market. The export 
restrictions hit the rice market significantly but the others only a little. This result is similar 
to that of Charlebois' (2008) partial equilibrium analysis. Higher oil prices caused the price 
rises of wheat and maize to some extent, which were, however, much smaller than the 
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estimates by Yang et al. (2008). This is because while Yang et al. (2008) conduct cumulative 
simulations for three years, we do one-shot short-run static analysis. Taking account of the 
realistic farm-land switching, the emergence of biofuels triggered a jump only in the maize 
price, while Rosegrant (2008) and Yang et al. (2008) suggest much larger impacts on all of 
these three crops. All the four shocks pushed up the crop prices by 10% or so. However, they 
can explain only a fraction of the whole price rises in 2008––about 90% of the price hikes 
should be attributed to non-real-side factors, i.e., speculation, as many earlier studies 
conclude.10 
 As Wright (2011) argues, the impacts of these shocks tends to be large when the 
crop stock level is very low, which makes the aggregate crop demand less price-elastic. 
Although we do not explicitly consider such stock behavior in our CGE model, we assume a 
smaller elasticity for the crop import demand (more specifically, a smaller elasticity of 
substitution in the Armington functions) to approximate such a situation. The results with a 
smaller elasticity, shown in Appendix III as a part of our sensitivity analysis, do not indicate 
any significant difference in our simulation results. Besides, it should be noted that the 
elasticity of substitution for the (top-level) Armington function assumed as the central case 
is 1.3 for maize following the GTAP database. This is indeed low for crops. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 We reviewed the impacts of crop failures, export restrictions on wheat and rice, the 
oil price hike, and biofuels emergence and speculation on the world crop prices using a world 
trade CGE model. Our key finding is that the real-side factors were not the main price 
driver during the recent commodity boom period, even when we consider the recent wheat 
crop failures in Australia and Ukraine, the latest evolution of the biofuels emergence, and 
                                                     
10 This result is robust irrespective of the assumed elasticities for the Armington functions, the food 
composite function, and the energy composite functions. The results of sensitivity analysis are shown 
in Appendix III. 
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the rigidity of farm-land switching. Therefore, conventional policy interventions would not 
be effective to fight against crop price hikes. That is, even if we prepare buffer stocks for 
possible lost harvests or temporal export restrictions, we can reduce a price hike by only 5–
10%, far smaller than the actual crop price rises. Although many countries have actually 
kept huge oil reserves, comparable to their domestic use for several months, these reserves 
did not prevent oil price rises. On the other hand, the new linkage between maize and 
petroleum markets through biofuels calls for a consistent policy package. While the 
petroleum price rise disturbed the maize market through increased biofuels production, the 
subsidized biofuels production further worsened the situation. We should have promoted 
research and development activities on biofuels production technologies, rather than 
increasing the production of biofuels, which consumed more maize and exacerbated the crop 
price hikes. 
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Figures and Tables 
Table 1: Crop and its Related Market Shocks in 2007/2008 
Scenario Factor Country Sector Type of Shock Magnitude 
Crop Failures Australia Wheat Productivity Decline 35% Ukraine Wheat 28% 
Export Restrictions 
Argentina What 
Export Tax 
28% 
Maize 25% 
China 
Wheat 20% 
Rice 5% Maize 
Egypt Rice 
Export Ban 95% Export Cut* India 
Wheat 
Rice 
Vietnam Rice 
Russia Wheat Export Tax 40% 
Crude Oil Price Hike World Crude Oil Export Price Rise 126% 
Biofuel Productions
Brazil Bioethanol Increase of 
Production 
162% 
USA 255% 
EU Biodiesel 345% 
Source: FAOSTAT, Sharma (2011), USDA (2008), and World Bank (2008). 
Note: Export ban is approximated with imposition of a 95% export quotas. 
 
Table 2: Estimates of Price Rise Factors 
Impacts of 
on Price Rises of 
Source Model Period Wheat 
[%] 
Rice 
[%] 
Maize
[%] 
Export Restrictions 2 7–16 2–3 Charlebois (2008) PE 2007, 2008 
Petroleum Price 
Rise 
18 – 31 Yang et al. (2008) CGE 2005–08
20 – 24 Mitchell (2008) Cost Analysis 2002–07
Biofuels 
Production 
22 21 39 Rosegrant (2008) PE 2000–07
26 – 44 Yang et al. (2008) CGE 2005–08
Note: PE and CGE refer to partial equilibrium and computable general equilibrium, 
respectively. 
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Table 3: Country and Sector Aggregations 
Country Sector 
Argentina Paddy Rice a 
Australia Wheat a 
Brazil Maize a 
China Other Grains a 
Egypt Oil Seeds a 
India Other Agriculture a 
Philippines Sugarcane and Beet a 
Russia Processed Rice a 
Thailand Other Foods a 
Ukraine Coal b 
USA Gas b 
Vietnam Electricity b 
EU Oil c 
Rest of the World Bioethanol c 
Biodiesel c 
Transport 
Others 
Note: a, b, and c indicate goods included in the food composite, non-liquid energy goods, and 
liquid energy goods, respectively. 
 
Table 4: Scenario Table 
Scenario 
Scenario Factor 
Crop 
Failures 
Export 
Restrictions
Petroleum 
Price Rise
Biofuels 
Emergence
Base Run – – – – 
C yes – – – 
R – yes – – 
P – – yes – 
B – – – yes 
A yes yes yes yes 
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 Table 5: Changes of Crop Prices and Decomposition of the Crop Price Hikes 
Scenario Changes [%] Share of Impact [%] Wheat Rice Maize Wheat Rice Maize 
Actual Price Rises 87.4 164.5 79.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 
C (Crop Failure) 
Price 4.5 0.0 –0.1 5.2 0.0 –0.1 
Production –0.2 0.0 0.0
Exports –7.3 0.0 –0.1
R (Export Restrictions) 
Price 2.0 9.7 0.5 2.2 5.9 0.6 
Production 0.0 0.0 0.0
Exports –3.5 –30.6 –1.6
P (Petroleum Price Rise) 
Price 1.8 –1.6 4.5 2.1 –0.9 5.6 
Production 0.0 –0.3 4.9
Exports –0.9 0.2 1.2
B (Biofuels Emergence) 
Price –0.1 –0.1 9.0 –0.1 –0.1 11.4 
Production –0.1 –0.1 7.4
Exports –0.1 –0.1 –2.9
Interactive Effects 0.3 –0.2 –3.0 0.4 –0.1 –3.8 
A (All) 
Price 8.6 7.8 10.9 9.8 4.8 13.8 
Production 0.0 –0.4 8.1
Exports –11.4 –29.6 –2.4
The Rest (Actual–A) 78.8 156.6 68.4 90.2 95.2 86.2 
Note: Price: crop prices of the representative exporters (i.e., the US for wheat and maize and 
Thailand for rice). Production and exports: the Laspeyres quantity index of world production 
and exports. 
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Figure 1: World Nominal Grain Prices and Biofuel Production 
Data Source: IMF Primary Commodity Prices, European Biodiesel Board, and Renewable 
Fuels Association. 
Note: 2004 average price of each commodity = 100. 
 
 
Figure 2: Land Uses in the US, Brazil, and the EU 
Data Source: FAOSTAT 
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Figure 5: Changes of Exports in Scenario A [unit: %] 
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Appendix I: Splitting Sectors in the GTAP Database 
 Maize is not distinguished but included as a part of other grains in the original 
GTAP database version 7.1; neither bioethanol nor biodiesel is identified there. Therefore, 
we newly create these three sectors by splitting the other grains and the oil sectors (Table 
I.1). Considering the relative size of the maize production vis-à-vis the other grains' (i.e., 
cereals other than rice and wheat) reported in FAOSTAT, we split the row and column of the 
other grains in the original social accounting matrix (SAM), constructed on the basis of the 
GTAP database. The column of the original oil sector and biofuels trade are split based on 
the cost component information and trade flows provided by Taheripour et al. (2008) with 
the biofuels production and price quoted for 2004 from various sources (Table II). The row of 
the original oil sector is split considering the share of oil and biofuels consumption. As these 
new inputs unbalance the SAM, we adjust it by solving a constrained matrix problem, à la 
Hosoe et al. (2010, Ch. 4). 
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Table I: Splitting Maize and Biofuels Sectors 
<Original SAM> 
 …
Other 
Grains … Oil …   
…           
Other Grains 
…           
Oil 
…           
↓ 
<New SAM> 
 …
Other 
Grains Maize … Oil Bioethanol Biodiesel …  
…          
Maize- 
Other 
Grains 
Ratio 
Other Grains ← Maize 
…           
Oil 
← 
Oil- 
Biofuels 
Ratio 
Bioethanol 
Biodiesel 
…           
↑ ↑ 
  
Maize-Other 
Grains Ratio  
Cost Components of 
Biofuels Production    
Note: Maize-other grains ratio is computed by FAOSTAT. The cost components of biofuels 
production and biofuels trade are reported by Taheripour et al. (2008). Data sources of other 
biofuels data are shown in Table II. 
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Table II: Biofuels Data Sources 
Data Fuel Type Data Source 
Production Bioethanol F.O. Licht, World Ethanol & Biofuels Report 
 Biodiesel National Biodiesel Board (the US) 
http://www.biodiesel.org/pdf_files/fuelfactsheets/Production_Graph_Slide.pdf
European Biodiesel Board (the EU) 
http://www.ebb-eu.org/prev_stats_production.php 
Price Bioethanol & 
biodiesel 
US Department of Energy "The Alternative Fuel Price 
Report," March 23, 2004. 
http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/pdfs/afpr_3_23_04.pdf 
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Appendix II: Model Equations 
 The full description of our world trade computable general equilibrium model is 
shown below. 
-Symbols 
Sets 
ji, : commodities/sectors (other than the food composite) 
fd : food commodities/sectors 
nfd : non-food commodities/sectors 
en : energy commodities (b.+c. in Table 3) 
nen : non-energy commodities (all but b.+c. in Table 3) 
nlq : non-liquid energy commodities (b. in Table 3) 
lq : liquid energy commodities (c. in Table 3) 
',, rsr : regions 
kh, : factors (capital (CAP), land (LAN), labor (LAB), natural resources 
(NATRES)) 
nl : factors other than labor 
 
Endogenous variables 
p
riX , : household consumption 
rXFD : food composite 
rECH : energy composite good for household 
rLQH : liquid energy composite good for household 
rjiX ,, : intermediate uses of the i-th good by the j-th sector 
rjhF ,, : factor uses 
rjEC , : energy composite good 
rjLQ , : liquid energy composite good 
rjY , : value added 
rjZ , : gross output 
riQ , : Armington composite good 
riM , : composite imports 
riD , : domestic goods 
riE , : composite exports 
sriT ,, : inter-regional transportation from the r-th region to the s-th region 
rTT : exports of inter-regional shipping service by the r-th region 
sQ : composite inter-regional shipping service 
 
p
rS : household savings 
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g
rS : government savings 
d
rT : direct taxes 
z
rjT , : production taxes 
m
rsjT ,, : import tariffs 
e
srjT ,, : export taxes 
f
rjhT ,, : factor input taxes 
 
XFD
rp : price of food composite 
q
rip , : price of Armington composite goods 
f
rjhp ,, : price of factors 
ec
rjp , : price of energy composite good 
lq
rjp , : price of liquid fuel composite good 
ech
rp : price of energy composite good for household 
lqh
rp : price of liquid fuel for household 
y
rjp , : price of value added 
z
rip , : price of gross output 
m
rip , : price of composite imports 
d
rip , : price of domestic goods 
e
rip , : price of composite exports 
t
srip ,, : price of goods shipped from the r-th region to the s-th region 
sp : inter-regional shipping service price in US dollars 
sr , : exchange rates to convert the r-th region’s currency into the s-th region’s 
currency 
rCPI : consumer price index (numeraire)  
 
Exogenous variables 
f
rS : current account deficits in US dollars 
rjhFF ,, : factor endowment initially employed in the j-th sector 
rjTFP , : productivity of j-th sector 
g
riX , : government consumption 
v
riX , : investment uses 
0
,riQ : initial Armington composite good 
d
r : direct tax rates 
z
ri , : production tax rates 
m
rsi ,, : import tariff rates on inbound shipping from the s-th region 
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e
sri ,, : export tax rates on outbound shipping to the s-th region 
s
sri ,, : inter-regional shipping service requirement per unit transportation of the 
i-th good from the r-th region to the s-th region 
f
rjh ,, : factor input tax rates 
 
-Household 
 (Utility function: 
fd
p
rfdrrr
rfdECHr
XFD
r XECHXFDUU ,,
  r  (B.1) 
Consumption demand functions 



   prdr
jh
rjh
f
rjhq
rfd
rfdp
rfd STFpp
X
,
,,,,
,
,
,

 rfd,     (B.2) 



   prdr
jh
rjh
f
rjhXFD
r
XFD
r
r STFpp
XFD
,
,,,,

 r     (B.3) 



   prdr
jh
rjh
f
rjhECH
r
ECH
r
r STFpp
ECH
,
,,,,

 r     (B.4) 
Food composite aggregation function 
 





  
1
,,
fd
p
rfdrfdrr XXFD   r    (B.5) 
(Note that ff  )1(  .) 
 rq
rfd
XFD
rrfdrp
rfd XFDp
p
X




 
1
1
,
,
,   rfd,    (B.6) 
Energy composite aggregation function for household 
 


   LQHCrECHrnlq r
nlq
p
nlq
ech
rr LQHXbECH
 ,  r    (B.7) 
 r
ech
rq
rnlq
ECH
rnlqp
rnlq ECHpp
X
,
,
,
    rnlq,    (B.8) 
 r
ech
rlqh
r
LQHC
r
r ECHpp
LQH     r    (B.9) 
Liquid fuel composite aggregation function for household 
 





 
/1
,,
lq
p
rlq
LQH
rlq
LQH
rr XbLQH    r    (B.10) 
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(Note that 
lqhlqh  )1(  .) 
 rq
rlq
lqh
r
LQH
rlq
LQH
rp
rlq LQHp
pb
X






1
1
,
,
,

  rlq,    (B.11) 
-Value added producing firm 
Factor demand function 
  rjf rjhf rjh
y
rjrjhrj
rjh Y
p
pb
F
va
j
va
j
,
1
1
,,,,
,,,,
,,
1


 




   rjh ,,    (B.12) 
Value added production function 
va
j
va
j
h
rjhrjhrjrj FbY


1
,,,,,, 

    rj,    (B.13) 
 
Energy composite aggregation function 
 
LQEC
rj
XEC
rjnlq
rj
nlq
rjnlq
EC
rjrj LQXbEC
_
,
_
,,
,,,,,
 


    rj,    (B.14) 
 rj
ec
rjq
rj
XEC
rjnlq
rjnlq ECpp
X ,,
,
_
,,
,,
    rjnlq ,,   (B.15) 
 rj
ec
rjlq
rj
LQEC
rj
rj ECpp
LQ ,,
,
_
,
,
    rj,    (B.16) 
 
Liquid fuel composite aggregation function  
 


/1
,,,,,, 


 
lq
rjlq
LQ
rjlq
LQ
rjrj XbLQ    rj,    (B.17) 
(Note that 
lqlq  )1(  .) 
 rjq
rjlq
lq
rj
LQ
rjlq
LQ
rj
rjlq LQp
pb
X ,
1
1
,,
,,,,
,,
 




    rjlq ,,    (B.18) 
 
-Gross output producing firm 
 (Production function: 






rj
rj
rj
rj
irjnen
rjnen
rjrj aec
EC
ay
Y
ax
X
TFPZ
,
,
,
,
,,
,,
,, ,,min  
      rj, )   (B.19) 
Demand function for intermediates 
rj
rjrjnen
rjnen TFP
Zax
X
,
,,,
,,     rjnen ,,   (B.20) 
Demand function for energy composite goods 
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rj
rjrj
rj TFP
Zaec
EC
,
,,
,     rj,    (B.21) 
Demand function for value added 
rj
rjrj
rj TFP
Zay
Y
,
,,
,      rj,    (B.22) 
Unit price function 


   ecrjrjy rjrj
i
q
rnenrjnen
rj
z
rj paecpaypaxTFP
p ,,,,,,,
,
,
1
  rj,  (B.23) 
 
-Government 
Demand function for government consumption 



   gr
sj
e
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m
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j
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d
r
g
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q
ri STTTTTXp
,
,,
,
,,,
,
,,,,  ri,  (B.24) 
Direct tax revenue 
rjh
jh
f
rjh
d
r
d
r FpT ,,
,
,,    r    (B.25) 
Production tax revenue 
rj
z
rj
z
rj
z
rj ZpT ,,,,      rj,    (B.26) 
Import tariff revenue    rsjsrUSAs rsjt rsjrse rsjm rsjm rsj TppT ,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1    rsj ,,   (B.27) 
Export tax revenue 
srj
t
srj
e
srj
e
srj TpT ,,,,,,,,     srj ,,    (B.28) 
Factor input tax revenue 
rjh
f
rjh
f
rjh
f
rjh FpT ,,,,,,,,     rjh ,,    (B.29) 
 
 
-Investment 
Demand function for commodities for investment uses  frrUSAgrprvriqri SSSXp ,,,    ri,    (B.30) 
 
-Armington composite good producing firm 
Composite good production function   iii ridririmririri DMQ   1,,,,,,    ri,    (B.31) 
Composite import demand function 
rim
ri
q
ri
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ri Qp
p
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ii
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,
  



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Domestic good demand function 
rid
ri
q
ri
d
riri
ri Qp
p
D
ii
,
1
1
,
,,,
,
  



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-Import variety aggregation firm 
Composite import production function 
i
i
s
rsirsiriri TM


1
,,,,,, 

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Import demand function 
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m
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-Gross output transforming firm 
 
i) For TRSi   (transportation):   iii ridririeririrri DETTZ   1,,,,,,   ri,    (B.36) 
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ii) For TRSi  :   iii ridririeririri DEZ   1,,,,,,    ri,    (B.39) 
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Balance of Payments 
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-Export variety producing firm 
Composite export transformation function 
i
i
s
srisririri TE


1
,,,,,, 

    ri,    (B.43) 
Export supply function 
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-Inter-regional shipping sector 
Inter-regional shipping service production function 

r
r
s rTTcQ         (B.45) 
Input demand function for international shipping service provided by the r-th country 
  ssz rTRSUSArz rTRS rr QppTT ,,,1 
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-Market-clearing conditions 
Commodity market 
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Factor markets other than labor 
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f
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f
rjLAB pp ,,,,      rji ,,    (B.50) 
Foreign exchange rate arbitrage condition 
srsrrr ,,'',       srr ,',    (B.51) 
Inter-regional shipping service market 
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Consumer price index (numeraire) 
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Appendix III: Sensitivity Analysis 
 As in many CGE analyses, our simulation results depend more or less on various 
parameters in the model that we assume. We conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to 
such key parameters as the Armington (1969) elasticity, the elasticity of substitution among 
various energy inputs, the one among foods, and the one among primary factor input. We 
also simulate the same shocks but assume perfect mobility of primary factors among sectors 
as Yang et al. (2008) assumed. 
 When we assume a larger elasticity value for the Armington elasticity, the impacts 
of the real-side factors are generally found to be larger, but this can explain only a small 
part of the crop price hikes (Tables II.1–II.2). A smaller elasticity of substitution among 
primary factors tends to generate a larger impact, particularly in the maize price–the 
real-side factors account for over 30% of the maize price rise (Tables II.3–II.4). The elasticity 
of substitution among energy inputs as well as the one among foods affects the simulation 
results only a little (Tables II.5–II.7). When we assume all the primary factors are mobile 
among sectors, the economies can adjust to shocks more flexibly. Therefore, the price 
changes induced by the real-side factors tend to be smaller (Table II.8). Overall, the 
assumptions about the elasticity parameters and the mobility of primary factors do not 
significantly alter our simulation results either qualitatively or quantitatively. 
 
Table II.1: Decomposition of Crop Price Hikes (Armington elasticity –30%) 
Scenario Change in Price [%] Share of Impact [%] Wheat Rice Maize Wheat Rice Maize 
Impact of   
C (Crop Failure) 4.5 0.0 –0.1 5.2 0.0 –0.1 
R (Export Restrictions) 1.9 8.0 0.6 2.2 4.9 0.7 
P (Petroleum Price Rise) 1.5 –1.5 5.1 1.7 –0.9 6.5 
B (Biofuels Emergence) –0.1 –0.1 9.9 –0.1 0.0 12.5 
Interactive Effects 0.3 –0.2 –4.2 0.3 –0.1 –5.3 
A (All) 8.1 6.1 11.3 9.3 3.7 14.3 
The Rest (Actual–A) 79.2 158.4 68.0 90.7 96.3 85.7 
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Table II.2: Decomposition of Crop Price Hikes (Armington elasticity +30%) 
Scenario Change in Price [%] Share of Impact [%] Wheat Rice Maize Wheat Rice Maize 
Impact of   
C (Crop Failure) 4.5 –0.1 –0.1 5.2 0.0 –0.1 
R (Export Restrictions) 2.0 13.2 0.4 2.3 8.0 0.5 
P (Petroleum Price Rise) 2.3 –1.5 3.3 2.7 –0.9 4.1 
B (Biofuels Emergence) –0.1 –0.1 6.8 –0.1 –0.1 8.6 
Interactive Effects 0.5 –0.1 –1.0 0.6 0.0 –1.3 
A (All) 9.3 11.5 9.4 10.6 7.0 11.9 
The Rest (Actual–A) 78.1 152.9 69.9 89.4 93.0 88.1 
 
Table II.3: Decomposition of Crop Price Hikes (elasticity of substitution among primary 
factors –30%) 
Scenario Change in Price [%] Share of Impact [%] Wheat Rice Maize Wheat Rice Maize 
Impact of   
C (Crop Failure) 5.8 –0.1 –0.1 6.6 0.0 –0.1 
R (Export Restrictions) 2.4 11.3 0.5 2.7 6.9 0.6 
P (Petroleum Price Rise) 1.8 –1.3 8.4 2.1 –0.8 10.6 
B (Biofuels Emergence) –0.2 –0.2 23.2 –0.2 –0.1 29.2 
Interactive Effects 0.5 –0.2 –7.2 0.6 –0.1 –9.1 
A (All) 10.3 9.6 24.8 11.8 5.8 31.3 
The Rest (Actual–A) 77.0 154.9 54.5 88.2 94.2 68.7 
 
Table II.4: Decomposition of Crop Price Hikes (elasticity of substitution among primary 
factors +30%) 
Scenario Change in Price [%] Share of Impact [%] Wheat Rice Maize Wheat Rice Maize 
Impact of   
C (Crop Failure) 3.8 0.0 0.0 4.4 0.0 0.0 
R (Export Restrictions) 1.7 8.7 0.5 2.0 5.3 0.7 
P (Petroleum Price Rise) 1.8 –1.7 2.4 2.1 –1.1 3.1 
B (Biofuels Emergence) –0.1 –0.1 3.3 –0.1 0.0 4.1 
Interactive Effects 0.2 –0.2 –0.9 0.3 –0.1 –1.1 
A (All) 7.5 6.7 5.3 8.6 4.1 6.7 
The Rest (Actual–A) 79.8 157.8 74.0 91.4 95.9 93.3 
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Table II.5: Decomposition of Crop Price Hikes (elasticity of substitution among energy 
inputs –30%) 
Scenario Change in Price [%] Share of Impact [%] Wheat Rice Maize Wheat Rice Maize 
Impact of   
C (Crop Failure) 4.5 0.0 –0.1 5.2 0.0 –0.1 
R (Export Restrictions) 2.0 9.7 0.5 2.2 5.9 0.6 
P (Petroleum Price Rise) 2.0 –1.2 3.4 2.3 –0.7 4.2 
B (Biofuels Emergence) –0.1 –0.1 9.0 –0.1 –0.1 11.3 
Interactive Effects 0.4 –0.1 –1.7 0.4 –0.1 –2.1 
A (All) 8.8 8.3 11.2 10.1 5.0 14.1 
The Rest (Actual–A) 78.5 156.2 68.2 89.9 95.0 85.9 
 
Table II.6: Decomposition of Crop Price Hikes (elasticity of substitution among energy 
inputs +30%) 
Scenario Change in Price [%] Share of Impact [%] Wheat Rice Maize Wheat Rice Maize 
Impact of   
C (Crop Failure) 4.5 0.0 –0.1 5.2 0.0 –0.1 
R (Export Restrictions) 2.0 9.7 0.5 2.2 5.9 0.6 
P (Petroleum Price Rise) 1.6 –1.9 5.9 1.8 –1.1 7.4 
B (Biofuels Emergence) –0.1 –0.1 9.0 –0.1 –0.1 11.4 
Interactive Effects 0.3 –0.3 –4.6 0.4 –0.2 –5.8 
A (All) 8.3 7.5 10.7 9.5 4.5 13.5 
The Rest (Actual–A) 79.0 157.0 68.6 90.5 95.5 86.5 
 
Table II.7: Decomposition of Crop Price Hikes (elasticity of substitution among foods=1.0) 
Scenario Change in Price [%] Share of Impact [%] Wheat Rice Maize Wheat Rice Maize 
Impact of   
C (Crop Failure) 3.9 0.0 0.0 4.5 0.0 0.0 
R (Export Restrictions) 1.8 7.4 0.5 2.1 4.5 0.6 
P (Petroleum Price Rise) 1.7 –1.2 3.9 2.0 –0.7 4.9 
B (Biofuels Emergence) –0.1 0.0 7.7 –0.1 0.0 9.7 
Interactive Effects 0.2 –0.2 –2.6 0.3 –0.1 –3.3 
A (All) 7.6 5.9 9.4 8.8 3.6 11.9 
The Rest (Actual–A) 79.7 158.6 69.9 91.2 96.4 88.1 
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Table II.8: Decomposition of Crop Price Hikes (all the primary factors mobile among sectors) 
Scenario Change in Price [%] Share of Impact [%] Wheat Rice Maize Wheat Rice Maize 
Impact of   
C (Crop Failure) 0.9 0.0 0.2 1.0 0.0 0.3 
R (Export Restrictions) 0.5 4.7 0.7 0.5 2.9 0.9 
P (Petroleum Price Rise) 2.6 –4.1 –2.6 2.9 –2.5 –3.2 
B (Biofuels Emergence) 1.0 0.1 –6.9 1.2 0.0 –8.7 
Interactive Effects –0.4 –0.4 3.8 –0.5 –0.2 4.8 
A (All) 4.5 0.3 –4.8 5.2 0.2 –6.0 
The Rest (Actual–A) 82.8 164.2 84.1 94.8 99.8 106.0 
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